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BOOK REVIEW
Making Disclosure: Ideas and Interests
in Ontario Securities Regulation
BY MARY CONDON
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) 353 pages.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a good book, about interests, ideas, policies, and law.
Essentially a case study of securities regulation in Ontario from 1945 to
1978, Condon uses a number of texts, both legal and non-legal, to explain
how new laws and policies come to be. Although empirically focussed on
the emergence of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) as a major
player in the regulation of the stock market exchange, the theoretical and
methodological implications go well beyond this. Condon's aim is no less
than the formation of an alternative theory of regulation, one that avoids
"the overdetermination of structural models" and the "underdetermination
of individualistic" ones.2 Her central claim is that regulation is a process of
"dynamic interaction" between interests and ideas, where ideas shape
which interest positions are seen as plausible, and interests "debate the
meaning to be attributed to" key regulatory concepts (If this sounds
opaque, it is, but most of the book is not.) Discovering, interpreting, and
understanding the connections among interests, ideas, and discourses, and
tracing these interactions through policy and regulatory decision making
forms the nub of the book.
Condon begins with a (very selective!) critique of theories of
regulation she sees as most influential; these are primarily empirical studies
from economists and political scientists based in the United States. She
reduces this literature to two kinds of studies: those that examine whether
regulatory agencies have achieved their statutory goals; and those that
describe how regulatory agencies behave, primarily through theories of life
cycle and capture. As Condon shows, this literature is problematic. The
goals of agencies are not easily discovered, the concept of interests
employed is simplistic, the unrelenting focus on regulatory outcomes is
[hereinafter Making Disclosure].
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problematic, and translating these concepts into quantifiable indicators may
achieve measurability at the expense of validity. The distinction between
private and public spheres and interests, for example, is complex, not
obvious. The drive to create empirically reproducible data, deemed
essential to measure the results of regulatory decisions, has meant that
non-quantifiable but central concepts such as cultures of regulation, the
development and interpretation of regulatory ideas, and the role of
texts-statutes, regulations, policies, and decisions-have been
insufficiently explored. Condon seeks to remedy these omissions. Using
documentary methodology, she examines how various legal and extra-legal
texts come to act as resources for regulatory action, how ideas are invested
with particular meanings, and how ideas and interests shape regulatory
cultures. Her primary "data" consists of decisions made by the osc, public
inquiry and commission reports, coupled with policy statements, briefs, and
submissions to public bodies. Condon asserts, then shows throughout the
book, that ideas, statutes, and laws always have several plausible
interpretations, so lawyers and judges, legislators, and regulators are always
engaged in the process of making law rather than simply un- or dis-covering
it. The values of the actors, the cultural and legal contexts of decision
making, and the legal principles set out in precedent and text ("black-letter
law") are the primary tools employed to create meaning. She concludes
that neither interest-only nor idea-only frameworks adequately explain
regulation. Ideas-here disclosure and self-regulation-"come to have
currency,"4 and this limits the positions that can be taken by the powerful.
She calls for analyses which "de-centre" interest-based theorizing in favour
of "fluid and dynamic" approaches.'
II. SUMMARY
The book begins by examining the origins of securities law and its
primary regulator in Ontario (and therefore in Canada), the osc.
Regulation began with a whimper, not a bang, apparently coming out of
one of the endless series of royal commissions on the mining industry that
punctuated twentieth-century Canada. Condon identifies the 1945 Securities
Act,6 which required all parties raising capital by offering stock to the public
4 Ibid. at 229.
5 Ibid. at 228.
6 [hereinafter Ach).
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to registerwith the OSC and file a prospectus disclosing all relevant material
facts, as her starting point. The Act exempted many trades and securities,
and put the onus on the OSC to grant registration to all "suitable"
applicants, refusing registration only when it was "clearly" in the public
interest to do so. Securities regulation, she shows, was intended to help the
mining industry raise needed capital by generating greater public
confidence in the market. This quest to develop the natural resources of
Ontario was seen as beneficial to all. Condon points out that "taking a flyer
on penny stocks" was practically a patriotic duty for privileged Canadians
at the time. Nor were legislators trying to make investment risk-free; a
certain amount of risk was seen as natural and necessary. But government
was not to act alone; it was to go hand-in-hand with self-regulation, as the
passage of the Broker-DealersAssociation Act in 1947 makes clear. Chapter
two looks at the construction and evolution of concepts such as disclosure,
discretion, public interest, and public protection, tracing the influence of
these ideas on osc decision making in the 1950s.
Chapter three looks at the "new" Securities Act of 1966 and its
genesis in the reports of three royal commissions and a provincial inquiry.
After setting out the social, political, and economic conditions of the early
1960s, Condon traces how two public scandals-the royal commission
inquiry into fraudulent mining claims involving the Windfall Company in
1964 and the collapse of Atlantic Acceptance Finance Company-resulted
in the 1966Act. She shows how ideas about self-regulation, the debate over
the role of the osc in protecting investors and the public, concerns about
liquidity, and public confidence, were interpreted to create policy. External
and internal factors were also important, because Canada's financial
system, banks, and economy were undergoing rapid change. Condon shows
how notions of the investor changed, from the "autonomous and patriotic
risk-taker" of the 1950s to the "prudent saver who had to be coaxed" into
the stock market of the 1960s! Condon devotes considerable attention to
explaining why recommendations to increase the amount and detail of
mandatory disclosure, demanded in many of the inquiries and reports, did
not translate into clear, unambiguous statutory requirements in the 1966
Act.
Chapter four continues this focus on disclosure, examining how
"ideas voiced and given substance at the political and legislative level"j
7 Ibid. at 97.
8Ibid. at 99.
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came to shape Osc policy and decision making. Regulatory activities before
and after the 1966 Act are contrasted. Four animating ideas-equity/
fairness, investor protection, concern for industry interests, and self-
regulation-are argued as pivotal, and each is traced first though its impact
on osc policy and then on osc decisions. Condon concludes that the Osc
received new languages, ideas, and powers from the public and legislative
debates of the 1960s. From this emerged its new stated principle-the need
to maintain public confidence through disclosure-operationalized through
the concept of investor protection. Although the osc gained expanded
powers from this process, it was forced to "articulate [these] in the language
of investor protection," which set limits on its expansion and scope. Here
and elsewhere, Condon insists private interests were not victorious either,
a result she attributes, in part, to the "multiplicity of contenders"9 and their
competing agendas.
The focus in chapters five and six shifts to the 1970s and the ideas,
languages, and policy debates that culminated in the 1978Act. Chapter five
examines the relations between the osc and one of its pivotal "interest
constituencies," the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) particularly the
arguments over whether legal or economic principles should form the basis
of regulatory activity. The key empirical issue here was the debate over
whether brokerage commission rates should be fixed or not. (The United
States, through the Securities and Exchange Commission, freed rates in
1975; the OSC in 1976 decided to retain them, though it reversed this in
1982.) As in previous chapters, Condon sets out the chronology of events
and the economic context of the debate before describing the position of
the TSE, the Osc, and the ensuing debate. She shows how the languages of
equity and reasonableness (languages of law) contrasted with languages of
efficiency and competition (languages of economics). Although the TSE
basically got the rate scheme it wanted, Condon resists an interest-theory
interpretation, arguing that a "more subtle" position is necessary because
the TSE's interests were "various, contradictory and the product of constant
negotiation and change."' In addition, she sees the TSE as successful only
because it incorporated arguments about equity into economic discourses
on competition.
9 Ibid. at 137.
10 Ibid. at 168.
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Chapter six examines the struggle from 1966 to 1978 to update
securities legislation and establish "a new regulatory blueprint."" Major
ideas underpinning this debate included the need for already listed
companies to file supplementary information whenever the company
experienced significant change in circumstances, the obligations of issuers
of securities (how much information they must provide), and the problem
of exemptions (particularly the loopholes surrounding transfers in
ownership and control, or take-over offers where only large shareholders
were approached). Condon traces the compromises negotiated and the laws
that emerged.
Securities lawyers came into their own at this time, developing into
a "distinctive interest"'- according to Condon, largely because the
regulatory statutes passed were so complex, specialized, and technical that
non-lavyers could not understand them. Disclosure continued its rise to
pre-eminence, enshrining its position as a "symbol of responsible
regulation"'3 and as a used and useful control strategy. On interests,
Condon again insists that, because the various business interests did not
speak with one voice (splits between small and controllingshareholders, for
example, were ongoing), and because strategic interest groups such as the
TSE won some battles but lost others, a simplistic interest theory position
is untenable. Moreover, she points out that even the most powerful
interests had to present their cases in language incorporating discourses of
equality and participation. This forced them to focus on more than naked
corporate interest (or, I would argue, to disguise it creatively). The book
concludes with a cursory attempt to highlight the most significant
developments in exchange regulation since 1978. (As Condon points out,
to do this adequately would require another book.)
1I Ibid. at 219.
12 Ibid. at 220.
L? Ibid. at 221.
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III. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
This is an interesting and important book. No one would claim it
was a laugh-a-minute; the dry, technical, and abstract nature of the debates
that form its core make that impossible. Considering that both legal and
post-modem languages are used, and that neither is known for the clarity,
brevity, or wit of its prose, the book is very well-written. And while the
issues discussed are complex and the analysis is pursued on several levels
simultaneously, the line of argument is generally easy to follow. Condon
never sacrifices complexity, however, to achieve clarity.
Switching from style to substance, does the book make important
contributions? It certainly does. On the methodological level, rather than
mouth fashionable rhetoric about how regulation works (or, more to the
point here, how it does not work to automatically further the agendas of
interest groups), Condon shows, carefully and skillfully, piece by piece, how
languages changed and how certain ideas and interpretations were
repeated, developed, and adopted as law and practice, while other equally
tenable interpretations disappeared. Thus the reader can see, often in
painful detail, exactly how legal ideas are "remade in argument," 4 how an
initial "multiplicity of readings" come to coalesce around one dominant
meaning. Because Condon's "close reading" is superb, her reconstruction
of events is convincing. At the theoretical level the book makes the
important point that ideas can limit interests, through language. In
Condon's terms, language had "an effect on the positions that could be
mobilized by interests.""5 In this arena, interests exerted influence, or lost
it, through the discourse of equality and investor protection. In other
arenas, different languages hold sway-victims' rights and the discourse of
risk, for example, define the debate over the punishment of "criminals."
In one way, however, this close reading, this attention to the
empirical detail found in policy papers and debates, is responsible for the
book's (sole) weak spot. In looking at how regulation occurs, Condon
forgets to ask why. Any position or interest that does not appear in the
textual record is not present in the analysis. Thus the book never probes
"deep structure." It never asks why certain ideas are not only not heard, but
why they never even make it into the realm of plausible, and therefore
debatable, alternatives. Condon is thus unable to interrogate the massive,
14 Ibid. at 12.
15
Ibid. at 223.
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unquestioned acceptance by all the major players, in government and
business, that the job of the state is to ensure the wealth of private investors
and the prosperity of corporations. Hence regulation, and the osc itself,
was shaped by the prerogatives of interest groups-but not at a level
accessible through textual analysis. Theoretical concepts such as hegemony
are necessary to understand and situate these forces, and probe the silences
in the debate.
Because Condon does not probe the origins of interests, or trace
them to structural roots-she claims there is no plausible explanation of
origins; interests are "formed and shaped by the sets of ideas that are
subject to interpretation," they are not "pre-legal entities"'--the book
leaves the impression that all interests are equal. Therefore all ideas are
equally likely to be generated, and have influence in policy debates. Indeed
this is why she sees the process as "inherently unpredictable."' 7 This makes
it possible to equate the interests of a provincial regulatory agency in
increasing its power with that of major corporate actors,' or to attribute
the failure of small stockholders to have their interests heard to their
absence from the policy table (their voices, she claims, had to be heard
through the positions proclaimed by the osc). Such arguments are not
necessarily wrong, but they are incomplete. Condon is correct in pointing
out that the process is complex-the specifics of the debate, the form the
arguments will take, and the ways in which interests and ideas will coalesce
to produce a particular policy outcome cannot be foreseen in advance.
They are, as she says, "the result of a dynamic and open-ended
negotiation." 9 But only certain outcomes can be thought, let alone
negotiated. The overall shape of the process, the form the debate will take,
the "prevailing discourses" that "shift,"211 the ideas that will or will not have
legs, the general arena within which compromises will be negotiated, is not
nearly as fickle or whimsical as Condon would have us believe. A
structurally informed interpretation would askwhy the range of ideas under
debate was so narrow, why equity among investors rather than equality
among citizens drove the debates, why the need to make Canada safe for
J6 Ibid. at 14.
1 7
bid. at 233.ff
18 Ibid. at 97-9Sff.
1 9 Ibid. at 223.
20 Ibid. at 14.
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corporations, and stock markets safe for speculators, was paramount, and
how these facts limited and restricted the regulatory debate in ways that
were, indeed, predictable.
This, then, is a book about stock market regulation that does not
discuss class or privilege, one that minimizes the role and significance of
economic interests. Because the only voices allowed into the debate came
from a similar, privileged place, the only significant conflicts of interests
appearing in the texts and debates were over the most appropriate means
to an end-the end being the promotion and preservation of private market
exchange. In this arena, corporate interests may appear as just another set
of players, competing among themselves, making arguments through
lawyers and stockbrokers. Their enormous national and international clout,
their collective ability to destroy Canada's economy, create a run on its
currency, double unemployment, and ruin the election chances of political
parties, are all rendered invisible. This happens both because the language
of law individualizes and depoliticizes debate, as many have noted, and
because all the players in the game Condon is analyzing were "inside the
tent." But to mistake invisibility for impotence is unwarranted. Stock
markets, stock market regulation, and the legal structures that make
exchange possible, predictable and orderly are absolutely central to
capitalism. Billions of dollars, not to mention the careers, prestige, and life
chances of the most powerful individuals and organizations in the world,
are involved. The Ontario Government and OSC officials, even in the 1960s
and 1970s, were well aware of these realities of economic life under
capitalism. Corporate interests, therefore, cannot be accepted analytically
as "just another interest group." Their hegemonic role in shaping ideas,
their influence on how stock market regulation is conceptualized, and who
it is for, are all the more important because they are invisible. These
priorities were not cited in legislative debates or legal texts-they did not
need to be-they were part of the ground rules that shaped the minds,
agendas and priorities of the players. Condon's relentless, microscopic
adherence to the empirical record, her meticulous and intelligent analysis
of what is on the table, prevents her from seeing its shape, and from noting,
let alone analyzing, its precipitous tilt to the right. Or, to continue the tent
analogy, she is so busy documenting the activities of those inside the tent
that the voices outside it are inaudible and the legions outside it, as well as
the ground on which it is pitched, are invisible. Thus, Condon can note that
some interests are excluded while others have privileged access to
[VOL. 39, NO. I
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regulatory discourse,21 but there is simply no place she can incorporate such
ideas into the analysis.
In sum, this is a well-written, well-argued book which amply repays
the effort it demands of the reader. While its most immediate relevance
may appear to be to the student of regulation, the book makes theoretical
and methodological contributions well beyond this. It would be a better
book, in my opinion, if it did not pretend economic structures had
disappeared-it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of conspiratorial 1970s
structural theory without ignoring them altogether, and it is particularly
ironic to do this in a book on stock market regulation! Nevertheless, I
learned much from this book and I suspect others will also.
Laureen Snider
Professor
Department of Sociology
Queen's University
Ibid. at 230.
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